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Abstract—Connected vehicles will be a prominent feature of
future Intelligent Transport Systems. Which means that there
will be a very high volume of wireless traffic that vehicles will
receive and process. Due to this large quantity of traffic, there
will be Quality of Service (QoS) constraints on the system that
means messages will need to be prioritised. As vehicles will have
a finite buffer to hold messages, the prioritisation scheme must
consider network throughput to ensure QoS requirements are
met. In our throughput authentication prioritisation technique,
a Markov model is used to detect abnormally large data traffic
users who are potential attackers performing a Denial of Service
(DoS). Our results show that the algorithm can efficiently enhance
network throughput.
Index Terms—Connected Vehicles, Message Prioritisation and
Network Throughput.
I. INTRODUCTION
Connected vehicles will communicate with infrastructure and
other vehicles for different reasons such as driving efficiency,
road safety and infotainment. There are many different types
of information that will be exchanged between vehicles
and infrastructure. For example, vehicles will periodically
broadcast Cooperative Awareness Messages (CAMs) which
include location, speed, identity and acceleration to surrounding
vehicles and infrastructure [1]. Vehicles can also be used as
public infrastructure to collect and share knowledge on an Area
of Interest (AoI) [2]. Connected vehicles even can provide
Internet access to other vehicles, advertising information, file
carry and transfer [3], and social applications (e.g., micro-blogs
or instant messaging) [4].
A. Authentication Prioritisation
To ensure trusted communications connected vehicles need
to have the ability to include a proof that they were the sender
of a message and receivers need to be able to verify this proof.
Digital signatures provide this non-repudiation capability plus
the ability to verify the integrity of the message [5]. However,
they are expensive to compute and to validate. Which is a
problem on two fronts, firstly, the devices signing messages and
verifying signatures have limited computational ability meaning
that they can only verify a limited number of signatures per
second at maximum. Secondly, an adversary may attempt to
spam these devices with messages to verify that they do not
provide useful information in an attempt to induce a Denial
of Service (DoS). The more messages a vehicle receives the
greater delay to verifying the signature of an important message.
With limited buffer, this will also reduce the effective data
rate and even lead to data loss. To resolve it, vehicles need to
prioritise which messages to authenticate.
Existing work on authentication prioritisation in vehicular
communication has typically investigated two main aspects
either: (i) randomly selecting messages to verify and (ii) based
on the physical distance of vehicles. In [6], messages in the
security queue are randomly picked for verification to reduce
data congestion. However, it cannot guarantee the performance
or important messages would be verified in time. A distance-
based prioritisation scheme was addressed in [7], [8].
Furthermore, those approaches did not consider the network
QoS such as network throughput, which is a is a particularly
important parameter for network performance. This is because
vehicular networks require very low latency and high reliability.
In additionally, the previous work did not investigate the impact
of an attacker who is broadcasting messages to cause a DoS
attack.
B. Contribution and Organisation
In this paper, we presented the technical details regarding:
(1) our authentication prioritisation techniques that are able to
improve the network throughput, and (2) the method used
to detect a data jamming attacker with the authentication
prioritisation algorithm. This paper is organised as follows:
in Section II the system model is defined, in Section III
the throughput maximised authentication was explained, in
Section IV the misbehaviour detection model is explained,
in Section V are the numerical results and analysis, finally
the paper concludes and presents further open challenges in
Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this paper, the vehicle communication system considered
is a multiple access system employing 3GPP LTE-V protocols,
specifically Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication. Vehicles
are able to send and receive CAMs, act as a relay node for a
store carry forward (SCF) [9] network or as a social network
participant [10]. As shown in Figure 1, the vehicle receives data
flows from different vehicles within its communication range.
Data is buffered for verification before any further actions are
triggered, for example, forwarding to other vehicles in an SCF
application or to share images in social networks.
Within the communication range of a vehicles set V =
{V1, V2, . . . , Vn}, Vi is able to communicate with other
vehicles. The received data flow at Vi is
{
Si,1, Si,2, . . . , Si,m
}
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Figure 1: The authentication prioritisation with attacker detec-
tion.
where m is the buffer window size which is defined as the
time duration TB , so the Si,m is represented the received data
from vehicle i at the time slot of m. If the data package stays
in the buffer longer than the time duration TB and has not
been verified, the data would be discard. At anytime t, the
whole data matrix in the buffer is defined as:
Bu =

S1,t+1 S1,t+2 · · · S1,t+m
S2,t+1 S2,t+2 · · · S2,t+m
...
...
. . .
...
Sn,t+1 Sn,t+2 · · · Sn,t+m
 (1)
In this paper, a prioritised authentication algorithm is applied
to enhance the network throughput and avoid data loss due
to the limited buffer window. However, the potential attacker
attempting to consume a finite size buffer to reduce throughput.
A attacker detection model is studied in this paper as well.
The assumptions are made for analysis in this paper as:
(1) the size of received data in each time slot is normally
distributed; (2) the attacker vehicles are broadcasting relatively
large data all the time; and (3) the detection is separated from
the authentication part and does not reduce authentication
computing capability.
III. LINK CAPACITY BASED AUTHENTICATION
PRIORITISATION
A. Link Capacity for V2V Communication
The road network is defined as the graph N = (J,E), where
J is the set of junctions and E ⊆ J × J is the set of roads
between junctions. There is a function L : E → R>0 that
provides the length of a road in meters. The overall number
of vehicles n located along a road i is modelled as Poisson
distribution [11], with a probability density function:
pi(n) = exp
(−L(i)
φi
)[
(L(i)/φi)n
n!
]
, (2)
where φi is the vehicle density on the road i.
For V2V communications the received Signal-to-Interference-
Noise-Ratio (SINR) from vehicle i to i′ is:
γ
(
ri,i′
)
=
Hi,i′PV2Vλr
−α
i,i′
σ2 + Ii
. (3)
where PV2V is transmission power, Hi,i′ is the channel fading
between vehicle i and vehicle i′, σ2 is the Additive White
Gaussian Noise (AWGN) power, ri,i′ is the distance between
i and i′, λ is the frequency dependent pathloss constant, and
α is the pathloss distance exponent. Ii is the interference from
co-frequency V2V vehicles. The interference to the vehicle i
(Ii) from neighbouring vehicles N(i) is:
Ii =
∑
v∈N(i)
PV2Vλr
−α
i,v . (4)
The expected interference power from the vehicles within
its communication range is [12]:
Ii = PV2Vλr
−α
1 +
 φV2VΞ(r,Ψ, 4)
2
√
1
PV2Vλ
erfc−1(0.5)

2
, (5)
where r1 is the distance to the closest vehicle, Ξ(r,Ψ, 4) =
arctan(Ψ) − arctan(r), and Ψ is the radius of the network
coverage area and φV2V is the vehicle density1 across the entire
road network.
As defined by Shannon theory, the network capacity related
to SINR is defined in Equation 6 where B is the channel
bandwidth and γ is the received SINR.
C
(
ri,i′
)
= B log2
(
1 + γ
(
ri,i′
))
(6)
So the mean capacity of a link between i and i′ is as follows,
with a detailed explanation presented in Appendix A.
C
(
ri,i′
)
= E
[
C
(
ri,i′
)]
=
∫ +∞
0
P
B log2
[
1 +
Hi,i′PV2Vλr
−α
i,i′
σ2 + Ii
]
> ζ
dζ dr.
=
PV2Vλr−α1 +
 φV2VΞ(r,Ψ, 4)
2
√
1
PV2Vλ
erfc−1(0.5)

2

×
∫ +∞
0
exp
[
−βrασ2
(
2
ζ
B − 1
)]
dζ
(7)
The effective throughput of a V2V link is defined as that
the actual data processing capacity from a vehicle to the
destination vehicle, which includes the two components: the
data transmission capacity and the data authentication capacity.
1The vehicles within the vehicle communication coverage area are considered
as the same Poisson distribution as they are on roads.
Algorithm 1 Message Prioritisation
function PRIORITISATION(Si, TAut, Pv2v, φv2v, r)
When Si reached, queen in Bu as Eq. 1.
for i ∈ V do
for j ∈ V do
DETECTION(ωr, W , P ′i,j , Pi,j)
if i is a normal vehicle then
Bu(i, j) = SORT(Si,j , ‘descending
′)
else
i is a attacker, drop the Si,j
So the effective throughput is:
Ceff
(
i, i′, S, TAut, r
)
=
∑t=m
t=1 Si,t∑t=m
t=1
(
Si,m
C(ri,i′)
)
+mTAut
(8)
where TAut is the message verification time.
B. The Authentication Prioritisation
For a normal verification process, the data will be authentic-
ated based on the arrival time in a first come first serve order.
Because of the limited computing capacity and buffer window
size, vehicles cannot process all the messages within the time
duration TB , so first come first serve order will lead to data loss
and reduce the effective data capacity. An alternate approach
is for the vehicle to prioritise which messages to verify based
on the size of the packet. The simplest and fundamental way
is to give a higher priority to larger package. The algorithm of
Authentication Prioritisation is to maximise effective throughput
across all vehicles:
Ap = max
i,i′∈V×V
{
Ceff
(
i, i′, S, TAut, r
)}
. (9)
However, there is a potential attack that the attacker vehicle
is randomly broadcasting large messages leading to data loss.
In this paper, we now apply a dynamic Markov model to detect
the misbehaving vehicles which broadcasting jamming data in
the V2V network. The process is shown in Algorithm 1 and
detailed in the next section.
IV. ATTACKER DETECTION MODEL
This section describes the dynamic Markov model to help
distinguish the data jamming attacker when prioritising the
authentication order. This analysis is based on the assumption
that an individual vehicle does not transmit large packets all the
time, but the size of the data follows the Normal distribution.
Therefore, a vehicle is considered an attacker if its transmission
data size follows a non-standard way.
The considered Hidden Markov Model uses a set of non-
visible states (X1, X2, . . . , Xn) which determine whether the
vehicle broadcasting the jamming data or not, while the visible
states (Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn) represent the package data received.
Algorithm 2 Misbehaviour Detection
function DETECTION(ωr, W , P ′i,j , Pi,j)
When the data reached, check the previous get ωr
for t=1:1:m do
Calculate probability P
(
O1:W
)
from Eq. 17, Eq. 21
and Eq. 22.
if P
(
O1:t
)
matched then
i is a normal vehicle
else
i is a attacker
So the transfer matrix of the different status of data package
sending by a vehicle is:
Z1 ω1r Z2 ω
2
r ω
i
r Zn
© → © → · · · ©
↓ ↓ ↓⊙ → ⊙ → · · · ⊙
X1 P
(
V 1
∣∣ ω(1)) X2 P (V 2 ∣∣ ω(2)) P (V i ∣∣ ω(i)) Xn
(10)
The problem can thus be modelled as a Hidden Markov
Model, with a transition probability matrix A for the observed
states, where Pi,j is the probability that the data Sn,i at the
time slot i the vehicle will receive the the data Sn,j at the time
slot j.
A =

P1,1 P1,2 · · · P1,n
P2,1 P2,2 · · · P2,n
...
...
. . .
...
Pm,1 Pm,2 · · · Pm,n
 (11)
Let set a hidden status of ωr =
{
ω1r , ω
2
r , . . . , ω
W
r
}
. So under
the hidden status condition, the probability of the observed
status O1:W where W is the observed window size is
P
(
O1:W
∣∣∣ ωr) = W∏
t=1
P
(
o(t)
∣∣ ωr) , (12)
This is the product of the hidden status probability.
P
(
V 1:W
∣∣∣ ωr) = W∏
t=1
P
(
o(t)
∣∣ ωr) = W∏
t=1
P ′ω(t),o(t), (13)
where P ′ω(t),o(t) is the probability of the hidden probability
under the hidden status condition. The detailed explanation is
in Appendix B.
After the data packet arrives in the buffer, the Hidden Markov
Model can calculate the observed status probability of each
time slot and compare it with the probabilities of expected
data size distribution, as shown in Algorithm 2.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The urban environment used in this study is a 1.7 km ×
1.3 km area of the city of Westminster, London2. It presents six
different road classification categories. Each different category
2https://www.openstreetmap.org/#map=16/51.4952/-0.1469
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Figure 2: The data loss ratio with different vehicle density.
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Figure 3: The data loss ratio with different buffer window
sizes.
relates to different vehicle traffic intensities and speed limits.
The carrier frequency is 5.9 GHz, vehicle transmission power
is 13 dBm and with 10 MHz bandwidth. The mean size of data
distribution is 1 MB and the variance is 5. The attacker data
size is 10 MB (only one attacker for a vehicle communication
range) and the vehicle density is from 100 to 500 per km2.
The digital signature verification time is 5.7 ms for OpenSSL
and the buffer window is from 100 ms to 500 ms.
The data loss ratio goes up when there are more vehicles on
the road, as shown in Fig. 2. It is shown that when the vehicle
density is low there is no data loss because the data flow did
not reach the limitation of the buffer. When the density climbs
to 500 km2 the loss ratio increased to 60% without prioritised
authentication. If the messages are prioritised, the data loss
ratio is 15 percentage points lower. The average data loss ratio
performance of prioritisation authentication is 14% better than
the non-prioritisation authentication. Another obviousness is
that attacker detection scheme has a negligible effect on data
loss.
In Fig. 3, the relationship between buffer window size and
loss ratio is addressed. The data loss ratio drops with the
increasing of the buffer window size. If the buffer window size
is over 450 ms, all the messages are verified. Oppositely, 63.7%
of messages are discarded for non-prioritisation and 50% for
prioritised authentication when the buffer is only 100 ms.
The network throughput has increased by applying prioritised
authentication, as the results displayed in Fig. 4, the throughput
is 20.7 MB/s but this figure was only 13.79 MB/s without the
authentication prioritisation. If the buffer size size is fixed,
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Figure 4: The effective throughput with different vehicle density
and buffer window sizes.
the number of the vehicle slightly drops down the network
throughput. This is the increasing number of the user’s greats
the interference by the co-frequency using. The buffer window
size still has a positive correlation with the throughput. It
is noticed that, compared with the non-detection prioritised
authentication, the detection model only increased the network
throughput about 7% that is because, in the simulation part,
only one attacker introduced. So it is still worth applying the
detection model.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND OPEN CHALLENGES
In this paper, we studied how to enhance the network
throughput by prioritising which messages to authenticate based
packet size. The results show that prioritised authentication
reduces the data loss ratio and increases network throughput.
At the same time, we applied a Markov model to detected
an attacker who aims to jam the data buffer with a Denial
of Service attack, which gets a good performance to success
detect the attacker. Actually, the data size distribution could be
a binomial distribution (small size CAM with large multimedia
data), it is more difficult to detect the attacker.
However, another attack type is that an attacker may using
small message to consume the CPU resources. There are
still challenges remaining. For example, the prioritisation
and detection algorithms would consume extra computational
resources that could otherwise be used to verify signatures.
Practical experiments need to be performed to determine the
impact this analysis has on signature verification performance.
The attacker may also use a more intelligent strategy instead
of continually sending large packets.
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APPENDIX
A. Average Network Capacity
The expectation of a non-negative continuous random
variable X is E[X] =
∫
t>0
P(X > t) dt. With the Poisson
Point Process (PPP) and fading distribution, the expectation
capacity for any single V2V link is [13]:
E
[
C
(
ri,i′
)]
=
∫ +∞
0
P
[
Hi,i′ > r
α 1
PV2Vλ
(
σ2 + Ii
)(
2
ζ
B − 1
)]
dζ,
(14)
where Hi,i′ is the channel fading from the vehicle i to the
receiver vehicle i′, PV2V is the transmission power, B is the
bandwidth, and Ii is the interference to the vehicle i.
E
[
C
(
ri,i′
)]
=
∫ +∞
0
exp
[
−βrασ2
(
2
ζ
B − 1
)]
Ii dζ (15)
If we applied Equation (5) in, the mean theoretical capacity
for a V2V link is:
E
[
C
(
ri,i′
)]
=
∫ +∞
0
P
B log2
[
1 +
Hi,i′PV2Vλr
−α
σ2 + Ii
]
> ζ
dζ dr
=
PV2Vλr−α1 +
 φV2VΞ(r,Ψ, 4)
2
√
1
PV2Vλ
erfc−1(0.5)

2

×
∫ +∞
0
exp
[
−βrασ2
(
2
ζ
B − 1
)]
dζ.
(16)
B. Hidden Probability
The whole set of the possible hidden status is Ω, so the
expectation probability of the observed status O1:W is:
P
(
V 1:W
)
=
∑
r∈Ω
P
(
V 1:T
∣∣∣ ωr)P {ω1r , ω2r , . . . , ωWr } (17)
then,
P
(
V 1:W
)
=
∑
r∈Ω
P
(
V 1:W
∣∣∣ ωr) T∏
t=1
P (ωt | ωt−1)
=
∑
r∈Ω
T∏
t=1
P
(
o(t)
∣∣ ωr)P (ωr(t)) ∣∣ ωr(t− 1))
=
∑
r∈Ω
W∏
t=1
P ′ωr(t),o(t)Pωr(t),ωr(t−1).
(18)
By recursing Equation (18), the expectation observed status
probability is
P
(
O1:W
)
=
∑
ω(W )
P
(
O1:W−1, OW , ω(W )
)
=
∑
ω(W )
P
(
OW
∣∣∣ O1:W−1, ω(W ))
× P
(
O1:W−1, ω(W )
)
,
(19)
from the conditions the OT and O1:W−1 are independent, so
P
(
O1:W
)
=
∑
ω(W )
P
(
O1:W , ω(W )
)
=
∑
ω(W )
P
(
OW
∣∣∣ ω(W ))P (O1:W−1, ω(W − 1))
×
∑
ω(W−1)
P
(
ω(W )
∣∣ ω(W − 1)) .
(20)
where
P
(
V 1:W , ω(W )
)
= P ′ω(W ),OW
∑
ω(W−1)
Pω(W−1),ω(W )
× P
(
O1:W−1ω(W − 1)
)
,
(21)
Where as the sets:
ϕj = P
(
O1:W , ω(t) = j
)
= P ′j,OW
 N∑
i
Pi,jϕi(t− 1)
 .
(22)
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